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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Case No. 940313-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Priority No. 2 
EDWARD TAPIA, : 
Defendant/Appellant : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
1URISD1CTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from three jury verdicts of guilty for distribution of a controlled 
substance within a thousand feet of a school, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8 
(1 )(A)(II) H 58-37-8 (5) (B) (Supp. 1993), in the Second Judicial District Court in and 
for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael j . Glassmann, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(f)(1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Did the trial court properly sentence defendant to three consecutive, five to 
life sentences for the first degree felony convictions of distribution of a controlled substance 
within one thousand feet of a school? 
This Court will not reverse a defendant's sentence for abuse of discretion unless the 
actions of the sentencing judge were inherently unfair or unless the judge imposed a clearly 
excessive sentence. State v. Nuttall. 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993). 
2. Was there sufficient evidence submitted at defendant's trial to sustain the jury 
conviction? 
This Court will not reverse a defendant's conviction for insufficient evidence unless 
the evidence presented, and the reasonable inference drawn therefrom, is so inconclusive 
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have had a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted. State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d 
578, 582 (Utah App. 1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES ANP RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (Supp 1993), provides that it is unlawful 
for any person to knowingly and intentionally distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance, or to agree, consent, offer or arrange to distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance[.] 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (b) (I) (Supp 1993), provides that a person convicted of 
distribution of cocaine, which is a substance classified in Schedule I or II is guilty of a 
second degree felony. 
However, the classification will be enhanced to a first degree felony pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (Supp 1993), which provides 
If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less 
than a first degree felony but for this subsection is guilty of one more than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense [.] 
Moreover, if, as in defendant's case, the crime is committed within one thousand 
feet of a school, the classification may also be enhanced. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (a) (I) (Supp 1993), provides that If a violation set forth 
above is committed 
in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of 
those schools; 
or if pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (a) (ix) (Supp 1993), the crime was committed 
within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in subsections 
(5)(a)(I) through (viii)[.] 
Any relevant state and federal constitutional provisions are reproduced in the 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with three counts of distribution of a 
controlled substance, a schedule II narcotic, within a thousand feet of a school (R. 1-4). 
Defendant pled not guilty to the charges and was bound over for trial in the district court 
(R. 13-15). Defendant was convicted by a jury of all three counts, each a first degree 
felony (R. 66-68), and sentenced to three five-to-life consecutive terms in the Utah State 
Prison (R. 72). 
Defendant filed a timely brief on October 6, 1994 (See first Appellant's Brief). 
Although the brief purported to be an "Anders" brief, It failed to comply with the 
requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); State v. Dunnr 639 P.2d 
168 (Utah 1981) and State v. Floresr 855 P.2d 258 (Utah App. 1993). The State filed 
a motion to strike the brief which was granted by this Court on November 19, 1994, and 
the Court ordered defendant to file a corrected Anders brief or regular brief by December 
3 
29, 1994 (Order, November 29, 1994). As of January 20,1995, the State had not 
received a copy of defendant's corrected brief and filed a motion to dismiss the case 
(Motion to Dismiss, January 20, 1995). Later that same day the State received an order 
from this Court stating that although the Court received a brief from defendant on January 
19, 1995, it rejected the brief for failure to comply with rule 27 (d), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, in that the brief lacked a summary of the argument Defendant was 
ordered to correct the error by filing a summary of the argument (Order, January 20, 
1995). The State received defendant's summary of the argument on January 27, 1995. 
The Court denied the State's motion to dismiss (Order, February 9, 1995). 
STATEMENT OF FACT? 
Due to an increase in drug trafficking in the Odgen area the local narcotics task 
force team enlisted the help of a citizen, Dennis Gamer, to help the police eradicate the 
street sale of narcotics by capturing street level dealers of cocaine (R. 46-52). Gamer was 
teamed up with Ogden police officer, Phillip Howell, working with the Weber-Morgan 
Narcotics Strike Force (R. 44 6C 51). Gamer would act as confidential informant by 
purchasing narcotics in order to identify drug dealers. Gamer, after becoming familiar with 
the area in which drug buys were taking place, would sit in the local bars and let drug 
dealers approach him to make a sale (R. 54-56). The sales would be controlled buys, 
meaning Gamer would be searched before going into the drug buy to establish that he was 
not in possession of narcotics. He would then wear an electric transmitter to the buy so 
that police could monitor the conversations. After purchasing the drugs Gamer would 
return to the officers who would take the drugs (R. 53-56). 
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As a result of the under cover operations Gamer had engaged In controlled buys 
from Mark Cruz and Chuck Hassey (R. 59-60). Gamer would dial a telephone number to 
a residence at 2538 Monroe In Ogden and arrange to buy drugs. Gamer and Officer 
Howell were going to try to arrange three buys from Cruz and Hassey in order to establish 
a pattern of activity in support of the drug distribution activity (R. 61-62). 
However, on January 28, 1994, when Gamer called the phone number at 2538 
Monroe he was informed by a person who identified himself as "Eddie" that Cruz and 
Hassey did not live there anymore (R.62-64 « 188). Eddie told Gamer that he knew 
Gamer had bought drugs from Cruz and Hassey. Eddie claimed he knew Gamer and what 
type of car he drove (R. 188). Eddie said that he would sell Gamer a "teener" which is a 
sixteenth ounce of cocaine (R. 62-64 SC 188). Eddie told Gamer to call him at 5:00, 
when Gamer got off work (R. 188). During the 5:00 phone call Eddie told Gamer to 
meet him at Stimpson's Market parking lot in order to exchange money for the drugs (R. 
70-72 6C 197). Garner agreed (R. 197). 
It was about 5:30 p.m. and the light was good. Officer Howell waited in a spot 
near the parking lot in order to observe the transaction (R. 72-75). As soon as Gamer 
pulled into the parking lot, a man, later identified as defendant, walked up to the car. (R. 
75-81). Gamer recognized his voice as that of the individual named "Eddie" that had 
talked to Gamer on the phone earlier in the day (R. 253-54) Gamer asked defendant 
where Cruz and Hassey had gone. He also asked how much he owed defendant for the 
drugs. Defendant stated "eighty" and Gamer counted out eighty dollars from the one 
hundred that Officer Howell had given him (R. 81-84). Gamer asked how he could reach 
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defendant and defendant told him to call him anytime and ask for "Puerto Rico" as some 
people in the house did not know who "Eddie" was (R. 84). Defendant gave Garner a 
small baggie of cocaine in exchange for the eighty dollars (R. 84-89). After defendant left 
Gamer's car, Officer Howell, in order to specifically identify the defendant followed him 
into Stimpson's Market, through the check-out isles and out of the store (R. 84-89). 
On a second controlled buy Officer Howell watched defendant leave the house at 
2538 Monroe and walk to Gamer's car parked in the parking lot at Stimpson's Market (R. 
98-101). Gamer and defendant again exchanged $80.00 for a teener of cocaine and 
discussed the whereabouts of Chuck Hassey (R. 215). 
On a third buy the same arrangement was made. Defendant sold a teener to 
Gamer for $80.00 in Stimpson's parking lot However, at the end of the third controlled 
buy, defendant asked Gamer to drive him away from the market and let him off down the 
street as he was worried someone in the market was watching him (R. 106-116). 
In all three controlled buys, defendant wore the same plaid jacket and exhibited the 
same behavioral traits such as walking from the house on Monroe, walking in the same 
manner and going directly to Gamer's car (R. 112-117). Moreover the drugs purchased 
from defendant were all packaged the same, usually indicating the drugs were packaged by 
the same dealer (R. 117 « 118). 
Additionally, measurements taken by Officer Howell establish that the parking lot at 
Stimpson's Market where defendant sold the cocaine to Gamer is approximately 363 feet 
from the door of Central Middle School (R. 119 6C120). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court may properly affirm defendant's convictions under Anders v. California. 
386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct 1396 (1967), because his claims that his sentences are an abuse 
of discretion and the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions 
are wholly frivolous for the reasons articulated by defense counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY CONVICTED OF THREE 
COUNTS OF DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE WITHIN ONE THOUSAND FEET OF A 
SCHOOL AND SENTENCED TO THREE CONSECUTIVE 
FIVE-TO-LIFE TERMS OF IMPRISONMENT. 
Abuse of Discretion 
The jury found defendant guilty of three separate counts of distribution of a 
controlled substance within one thousand feet of a school. For each offense, a first degree 
felony, the sentence is a five year to life term of incarceration in the Utah State Prison. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203 (1) (1990). The sentences may be imposed consecutively. 
IsL Three consecutive five to life terms for three convictions of first degree felonies is the 
sentence proscribed by state statute. Sss. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (Supp 
1993); Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (b) (I) (Supp 1993); Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(5) (Supp 1993) and Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(5) (a) (I) (Supp 1993). As the 
judge imposed a sentence required by statute, he did not impose a "clearly excessive" 
sentence. State v. Nuttallr 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993). 
Nor does the record reflect that the judge's sentence Is Inherently unfair. 1& 
Defendant cannot show that "no reasonable person would take the view of the trial court." 
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Id., citing State v. Gerrard. 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978). Therefore, defendant's 
consecutive sentences are proper. 
Insufficiency of the Evidence 
Gamer, a citizen volunteer, not motivated by payment but a sense of duty to rid the 
streets of crime, was solicited by defendant to purchase drugs (R. 46-52 ST. 61-62). 
Gamer initially called the residence at Monroe street to contact Cruz or Hassey, not 
defendant (R. 62-64 & 188). Indeed, Gamer had no idea who defendant was at the time 
the buy was arranged (R. 188). At trial Gamer identified the voice on the phone that set 
up the buy as the same voice as defendant's (R. 201 & 255-56). Gamer met with and 
purchased drugs from defendant on three separate occasions while sitting in a car in a 
parking lot (R. 201-234 ). No one but Gamer and defendant were present in the car 
during the buys (R. 82). Gamer and the narcotics officer, Officer Howell, had the 
opportunity to identify and observe defendant on three separate occasions when the drug 
buys were made (R. 61-118 « 189-238). Additionally, both Gamer and the officer 
identified defendant in court as the man that engaged in the drug buys (R. 78 fit 214). 
In support his claim that he did not sell drugs, defendant testified that he was 
hanging around the parking lot at Stimpsons when some man he had never met (Gamer) 
motioned defendant over to the car and started asking questions about "Chuckie". 
Defendant claimed he did not talk to Gamer on the phone and that he never made 
arrangements to meet in the parking lot (R. 303-307). Defendant claimed he went over 
to the car on the second occasion because he saw Gamer staring at him from the car as 
defendant walked into the parking lot (R. 308). Defendant claimed Gamer asked about 
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"Chuckle" again but at no time did he ever sell or offer to sell drugs to Garner (R. 301 -
313). 
The evidence submitted at defendant's trial, and the reasonable Inferences drawn 
therefrom, Is sufficient to sustain his convictions. This Court has only limited authority to 
review a conviction when a sufficiency of evidence claim is raised. State v. Garrett, 849 
P.2d 578, 582 (Utah App. 1993). In reviewing a conviction on a sufficiency of the 
evidence claim, this Court reviews all the evidence, and inferences from such evidence, in a 
light most favorable to the jury's verdicts State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 
1983); State v. lohnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989); State v. Sherardr 818 
P.2d 554, 557 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). A jury 
verdict will only be reversed if the evidence "is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that 
defendant committed the crimes, lohnson. 774 P.2d at 1147; State v. Ireland. 773 P.2d 
1375, 1379 (Utah 1989); Petree, 659 P.2d at 444. 
This appeal is wholly frivolous because it is predicated solely upon defendant's claim 
that the jury should have believed defendant's testimony over that of the citizen informant 
and the narcotics detective. However, the assessment of witness credibility is a matter 
solely for the jury. Here, the jury chose to believe the testimony of Garner and officer 
Howell over that of defendant. Garrett, 849 P.2 at 582. 
Defendant advances no basis for rejecting the jury's credibility assessment. This 
Court should therefore affirm defendant's conviction because "the evidence, and the 
reasonable Inferences that may be drawn therefrom, are not 'sufficiently inconclusive or 
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inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted.'" Garrett. 849 P.2d at 
852 (quoting State v. Petree 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm 
defendant's convictions for distribution of a controlled substance. 
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED 
Because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs, oral 
argument would not significantly aid the Court in deciding this case. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED the o^4 of February, 1995 
)AN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
/JULIE GEORGE (J 
/ Assistant Attorney General 
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